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Each of three plaintiff-families purchased household goods' "on time"
from the defendant-merchants.2 In each instance plaintiffs were unable
to complete payments.' The defendants seized or threatened to seize the
property pursuant to a New York civil statute permitting the forcible
seizure of the goods without a court order.4 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the repossessions and requested that a federal three-judge court declare the
statute unconstitutional as being violative of the fourth amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Financially unable to secure a surety
or post the bond prescribed by the statute to replevy the goods until such
time as a judicial determination of the rights of the parties could be made,
the plaintiffs obtained temporary restraining orders to prevent the de-
fendants from seizing the property. Held, permanent injunction granted:
The provisions of the New York statute permitting the forcible, pre-
hearing seizure of chattels by an unsatisfied creditor without an order
'These goods included the following items: Laprease had a bed, box-spring and mattress, a
highchair, an 11-piece dinette set and other household furnishings; Lawson had a stove and a
refrigerator; and Messler had kitchen furniture, a rug, 3 end tables, lamps, a chair and a record
player. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
a Two separate actions were joined for consideration. Also named as defendants were nonjudicial
enforcement officers, city marshals, a sheriff, and the attorney general of the State of New York.
Id. at 716, 720.
a Mrs. Laprease, a welfare recipient, was threatened with seizure of conditionally sold goods pur-
suant to the statute by defendants Engles, marshal for the city of Syracuse, and representatives
of Raymours. One of the representatives agreed to hold the seizure in abeyance if certain payments
were made. Mrs. Laprease was unable to make these payments and alleged that she was in immediate
danger of having the goods seized and that the goods were necessary and essential for the health
of herself and her family. She further alleged that she was unable to post the bond required by
the statute to retrieve the goods and was unable to replace the goods in the event of seizure.
The Lawsons had as their sole income $77.50 a week derived from Mr. Lawson's wages. The
Lawsons' total assets consisted of goods purchased on time from Mantell's. The Lawsons met their
payments to Mantell's until Mr. Lawson's income ceased as a result of an illness. In a subsequent
agreement Mantell's agreed not to repossess the goods if one-half of the normal bi-weekly payments
was made. The Lawsons alleged that they made payments pursuant to the agreement, but that the
goods were seized by Mantell's in violation of the agreement.
Mrs. Messler was a recipient of Aid for Dependent Children and had no other income. Her
husband purchased goods on time from Mantell's, but subsequently stopped payment on these
goods. Mrs. Messier entered into an oral agreement with Mantell's whereby she agreed to assume
the payments on the furniture if she could obtain title to the goods. A representative of Mantell's
threatened subsequently to seize the goods if she did not surrender them voluntarily. Id. at 719-20.
4 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW §§ 7102, 7110 (McKinney 1963). Section 7102 provides in relevant
part:
(a) Seizure of a chattel. The sheriff shall seize a chattel without delay when the
plaintiff delivers to him an affidavit, requisition and undertaking and, if an action
to recover the chattel has not been commenced, a summons and complaint.
(f) Disposition of chattel by sheriff. Unless the court orders otherwise, the sheriff
shall retain custody of the chattel for a period of three days after seizure. At the
expiration of such period, the sheriff shall deliver the chattel to the plaintiff if there
has not been served upon him either a notice of exception to plaintiff's surety, a
notice of motion for an impounding order, or the necessary papers to reclaim the
chattel. Upon failure of the surety on plaintiff's undertaking to justify, the sheriff
shall deliver possession of the chattel to the person from whom it was seized.
See notes 46-47 infra, and accompanying text for definition and description of affidavit, requisition,
and undertaking.
Section 7110 provides: "If a chattel is secured or concealed in a building or enclosure and
it is not delivered pursuant to his demand, the sheriff shall cause the building or enclosure to be
broken open and shall take the chattel into his possession."
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from a judge or a court of competent jurisdiction violate the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp.
716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONJUDICIAL REPOSSESSION
At early common law the physical possession of property was the most
important manifestation of the right of ownership.' Thus, a seller's right
to repossess goods from a buyer who refused to pay for them was recog-
nized. But courts, busily engaged in real estate disputes, offered lengthy
and cumbersome procedures to the impatient and unpaid seller of per-
sonalty." The Statute of Marlbridge' was an early attempt to rectify this
situation. Pursuant to this statute the sheriff was permitted upon receipt
of a complaint to seize goods alleged to be wrongfully taken. While origi-
nally available only for goods wrongfully taken, the statute was later
expanded to include the repossession of goods rightfully taken, but wrong-
fully detained. The sellers of merchandise were thus able to recover their
goods without resort to the courts. This was the origin of the doctrine of
self-help, or repossession.
American jurisdictions have adopted variations of the English concept
of repossession. In Kenny v. Planer,'0 decided in 1869, the right of a seller
to recover a conditionally sold sewing machine from a buyer who failed
to meet his payments was upheld. The court noted that the right to possess
one's own property allows him to use any possible means short of a breach
of the peace to recapture it.1 Some jurisdictions have recognized con-
tractual agreements providing for nonjudicial repossession." In a notable
example, Percifield v. Florida," the seller repossessed an automobile on
which the buyer had paid nothing, and in which the buyer had placed a
"for sale" sign. The court held that the seller had committed no offense
in repossessing the automobile, provided no breach of the peace was com-
mitted, and that a provision of the sales contract either expressly or im-
pliedly provided for repossession upon default without judicial process.1"
Some form of nonjudicial repossession was recognized in virtually every
jurisdiction by 1919 when the Uniform Commercial Sales Act (UCSA)
was drafted." Section 16 of the UCSA merely reiterated some of the
century-old accumulation of American case law, permitting in most cases
the repossession of conditionally sold chattels without judicial process upon
default, provided that (1) this could be done without a breach of the
F. POLLOCK & R. WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 1 (1888).
6 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
27 (1923).
"Note, The Forcible Recaptios of Chattels, 28 L.Q. REv. 263, 264-65 (1912).
8 Statute of Marlbridge of 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 21.
9 Note, supra note 7, at 265.
1'09 N.Y.C.P. 131 (1869).
111d. at 134.
12See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1331-34 (1943).
1893 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927).
14 For an excellent discussion on the concept of the defaulting vendee, see Comment, Non-
Judicial Repossession-Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 435, 437 (1970).
15 Id.
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peace, and (2) this was part of a contractual agreement." The Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which superseded the UCSA, similarly author-
ized nonjudicial repossession of secured interests."
The UCC has been enacted in Texas"8 and, therefore, as to secured
transactions, nonjudicial repossession is possible.1" Unsecured goods are
treated somewhat differently, however. The relevant Texas statutes pro-
vide that an officer of the appropriate court may issue a writ of attach-
ment upon the receipt of an affidavit from the plaintiff, his agent or his
attorney." The affidavit must allege that the defendant is justly indebted
to the plaintiff.2' Further, it must state that the plaintiff will probably
lose his debt unless such attachment is issued. 2' The writ cannot issue until
suit has been instituted" and the plaintiff has posted bond or obtained
sureties to protect the defendant against wrongful actions. 4 The writ is
delivered to the sheriff or constable" who, upon receipt, proceeds to levy
upon the property. The defendant is permitted to replevy at any time
prior to judgment by posting bond or obtaining sureties. 7
While the nonjudicial remedy of repossession was developed for the
protection of the rights of creditors, the remedy has often failed adequately
to safeguard whatever rights debtors might have in certain types of
property.
II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTION OF A DEBTOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
At common law little sympathy was shown towards debtors unable to
satisfy their obligations. 8 In the past there was a tendency to ignore what
are now considered to be the requirements of procedural due process with
respect to debtors' property rights." Recently the Supreme Court has
18 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL SALES ACT § 16.
17 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on de-
fault the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of peace or may proceed by action."
" TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (1968).
"The provisions in a security agreement giving the lienholder the right to repossess in the
event of a default, without notice to, or consent of, the debtor (and even over his protest), are
valid, provided that this right is exercised without the use of either force or violence. Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error dismissed.
"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (1959):
The judges and clerks of the district and county courts and the justices of the
peace may issue writs of original attachment . . . upon the plaintiff, his agent or
attorney, making an affidavit stating:
(1) That the defendant is justly indebted to the plaintiff, and the amount of the
demand, and . ...
(12) That the debt is due for property obtained under false pretenses . ...
21 Id.
" "The affidavit shall further state that the attachment is not sued out for the purpose of
injuring or harrassing the defendant; and that the plaintiff will probably lose his debt unless such
attachment is issued." Id. art. 276.
23 Id. art. 277.
24 Id. art. 279.




8 C. NADLER, THE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF 2 (1954).




apparently begun to reverse this trend." Particularly of interest is a re-
cent decision concerning the garnishment of wages.
Wisconsin permitted the prejudgment garnishment of wages and merely
required that the creditor request the court clerk to issue a summons to
be served on the debtor's employer."1 Thus, the debtor might first learn
of the garnishment of his wages on the day he received his paycheck. In
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." the Supreme Court held that Wiscon-
sin's prejudgment garnishment statute, with its confiscation of property
without notice and prior hearing, violated the debtor's right to funda-
mental due process. The Court reasoned that wages are a specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in the national economic system 3'
In most situations those having wages garnished are unable to adjust to
any reduction of income, even for a short time. The very least that they
must be accorded in terms of procedural due process is a hearing in advance
of the initiating order. 4 At this hearing the validity, or at a minimum the
probable validity, of the claim must be established before the wage earner
may be deprived of the unrestricted use of his property.'
A possible exception to the prohibition of prejudgment garnishment
exists when in extraordinary circumstances summary denial of property
rights without due process may be both justified and permissible.' In
Fahey v. Malone 7 the United States Supreme Court held that one may
be deprived of property by administrative action prior to a hearing when
such action is essential to protect a vital governmental interest or the
general public. Here the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration, with-
out notice or hearing, appointed a conservator for the Long Beach Federal
Savings and Loan Association on the grounds that the Association was
conducting its affairs illegally." The Administration alleged that the man-
agement was unfit and was jeopardizing the interests of its members,
creditors, and the public." The Court rejected the contention of the Asso-
ciation's shareholders that they had been denied due process. The Court
conceded the drastic nature of appointing a conservator without a hearing,
but noted that the "delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility
of preserving credit during an investigation has made it an almost in-
variable custom to apply supervisory authority in this summary manner.""
"0 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), wherein the Court held that welfare pay-
ments could not be denied a recipient without due process of law. The Court specifically held that
denial of welfare entitlements, in order to satisfy the minimal standards of procedural due process,
must be preceded by some form of evidentiary hearing in which the welfare recipient might con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
3
' Ch. 127, § 10, [1969] Wis. Laws 237.
"2395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'Id. at 340.
4 1d. at 343, citing United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934).
' Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). How-
ever, the Court has held that if the creditor has obtained a judgment against his debtor, the debtor's
wages may be garnished without a hearing since the judgment is deemed to be sufficient notice. En-
dicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopaedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1929).
'" Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1950).
37332 U.S. 245 (1946).





Thus, a balancing test must be applied before procedural due process can
be compromised.' 1
III. LAPREASE V. RAYMOURS FURNITURE CO.
In Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.' a three-judge court in the
northern district of New York held unconstitutional those provisions of
a New York statute' permitting the forcible, prehearing seizure of prop-
erty by an unsatisfied creditor. The panel based its decision on both the
fourth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
The Fourth Amendment. The procedure outlined by the statute allowed
the sheriff, in repossessing a concealed chattel that was not delivered to
him upon demand, to forcibly break into any enclosure or building where
the chattel might be found." He was armed only with what was termed
by the statute to be an affidavit, a requisition, and an undertaking." Briefly
defined, the affidavit required, among other things, identification of the
chattel to be repossessed and statement of its value." The "undertaking"
was in effect a bond in an amount "not less than twice the value of the
chattel stated in the plaintiff's affidavit."' 7 The "requisition" was appar-
ently the only order the sheriff possessed to authorize seizure of the chattel
41 There are other instances where extraordinary circumstances exist and in which it is neither
practical nor possible to wait for procedural due process. When a particularly urgent situation
emerges, an immediate response is necessary. The Court will sustain these extraordinary responses.
See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vita-
min product); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (adoption of wartime price regula-
tions); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of food not
fit for human consumption). One court of appeals has stated that "in a wide variety of situations,
it has long been recognized that where harm to the public is threatened, and the private interest
infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary action
pending a later hearing." R.H. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
42315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
'N.Y. CIv. PlAc. LAW §§ 7102, 7110 (McKinney 1963).
44 Id.; see note 3 supra.
" If an action has been commenced by the alleged creditor, the statute requires the plaintiff to
additionally deliver to the sheriff a summons and a complaint. See note 3 supra. However, the
court interpreted the statute as not requiring service of the summons and complaint by the sheriff
upon the alleged defendant, while seizing the property. 315 F. Supp. at 722 n.8; see note 62 infra,
and accompanying text.
'N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 7102(c) (McKinney 1963):
(c) Affidavit. The affidavit shall clearly identify the chattel to be seized and shall
state:
1. that the plaintiff is entitled to possession by virtue of facts set forth;
2. that the chattel is wrongfully held by the defendant named;
3. whether an action to recover the chattel has been commenced, the defendants
served, whether they are in default, and, if they have appeared, where papers may
be served upon them; and
4. the value of each chattel or class of chattels claimed or the aggregate value of
all chattels claimed.
4
7 1Id. § 7102(e):
(e) Undertaking. The undertaking shall be executed by sufficient surety, acceptable
to the sheriff. The condition of the undertaking shall be that the surety is bound in
a specified amount, not less than twice the value of the chattel stated in the plain-
tiff's affidavit, for the return of the chattel to any person to whom possession is
awarded by the judgment, and for payment of any sum awarded by the judgment
against the person giving the undertaking. A person claiming a lien on the chattel
may except to the plaintiff's surety . ...
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and was "deemed the mandate of the court."'" No search warrant was re-
quired, nor was any intervention or action by a judicial officer contem-
plated. The Laprease court held this procedure to be unconstitutional on
its face, in violation of the fourth amendment as applied through the
fourteenth."
The court noted that the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures in both civil and criminal matters.' Any search of
a private dwelling without a search warrant as required by the fourth
amendment, the court argued, is presumptively unreasonable."1 The ra-
tionale is the prohibition of arbitrary intrusions of private property by
government officials. Warrantless searches are permissible only under ex-
ceptional circumstances,"2 but none existed in the situation confronting the
court in Laprease. Hence, the unconstitutionality turns on the application
of the fourth amendment to civil matters." Even though support is found
only in dictum of a United States Supreme Court decision," argument
with the court on this point is difficult, especially in view of the particular
situation. A private party, desiring repossession under the New York
statute, can in effect raise himself to the legal status of a law enforcement
officer and require the sheriff, acting as his agent, to beat down the door
of anyone concealing unsatisfactorily paid-for property, simply by filling
out a few papers and without even an ex parte proceeding before a judge.'
The possibilities for abuse should be apparent."
While the application of the fourth amendment to civil proceedings
may or may not be a novel concept, the importance of Laprease would
4Sld. § 7102(d).
49315 F. Supp. at 722.
so See note 51 infra.
"1For this proposition the court cited James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 903, 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). If such a presumption of unconstitutionality exists, it must be rebuttable since the holding
of unconstitutionality was reversed by the Supreme Court sub nom. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971). In Wyman a mandatory visit of a welfare recipient's home by a caseworker was held
constitutional. The Court noted that the Wyman facts were distinguishable from prior cases in-
volving searches of dwelling houses since in Wyman the refusal to allow the caseworker to enter
was not made a criminal offense. The Court said: "If a statute made [the welfare recipient's] re-
fusal a criminal offense, and if this case were one concerning her prosecution under that statute,
Camara [v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)] and See [v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967)] would have conceivable pertinency." 400 U.S. at 325.
Although Laprease was not a criminal prosecution, had plaintiffs resisted the repossession they
could have been prosecuted under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.05 (McKinney 1965):
Obstructing governmental administration
A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intention-
ally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental
function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an
official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means
of any independently unlawful act.
52 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
53 But see note 51 supra.
4Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967), in which the Court stated: "It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
" The Laprease court took special exception to the statutory requirement that the requisition
be deemed the mandate of the court; rather, such was "the mandate of the plaintiff's attorney
issued without the examination of an intervening magistrate, and resulting in a taking against the
will of the owner." 315 F. Supp. at 722.
""if the sheriff cannot invade the privacy of a home without a warrant when the state in-
terest is to prevent crime, he should not be able to do so to retrieve a stove or refrigerator about
which the right to possession is disputed." Id.
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appear to lie in the voiding of the New York statute under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Due Process. The court in Laprease equated the repossession of certain
household furnishings and "other necessaries" with the loss of wages in
Sniadach.5 Both courts termed the property involved "special." In Snia-
dach, however, the Supreme Court defined precisely what property was
to be included as "special"--wages. In Laprease "special" property seems
to have no boundaries. No test is established to determine whether certain
property is "special." By leaving this question unanswered, Laprease seem-
ingly indicates that a characterization of property as "special" would turn
on the exigencies of each case. The courts, in making such a determina-
tion, would not be bound to any limitations; rather, each determination
would be based on the individual judgment of each court involved.
Interestingly, the court discussed the objectionable aspects of taking
necessaries from persons because of the extreme hardships created." No
mention was made of property that is not a necessary of daily life. A
glance at the list of goods repossessed in Laprease would reveal examples
of items that were only questionably necessaries." The court apparently
thought it unwise to make fine distinctions. That the goods taken might
have been necessaries was sufficient for the court to hold the prehearing
seizure unreasonable. Had such a distinction been made, endless litigation
might have been commenced by creditors in an attempt to distinguish
between necessaries and non-necessaries.
In effect the court has pronounced unconstitutional those provisions of
the statute that deny persons their "special" property without due process.
The court determined that the statute was unconstitutional even as applied
to a family above the poverty level!' who might be able to redeem the
property through a surety or by posting a bond as prescribed by the
statute." The objection to the statute is that it may take a person's prop-
erty without notice and an opportunity to be heard. That he may be able
to retrieve his property after a temporary taking does not obviate the lack
of due process.
Another shortcoming of Laprease is its failure to explain whether the
relevant provisions of the statute might be upheld if sufficient notice of
a pending suit were given. The statute does not require the creditor to
commence an action prior to serving the sheriff with the papers necessary
to obtain repossession. If the creditor has not commenced an action he
must serve upon the sheriff a summons and a complaint; but the sheriff is
not statutorily required to serve upon the debtor any more than the
affidavit, the requisition, and the undertaking."' Thus, the debtor may be
57 Id. at 723.
58 Id.
" It is with difficulty that an 11-piece dinette set, 3 end tables, and a record player can be
recognized as essentials. See note 1 supra.
"°315 F. Supp. at 723.
"N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 7102(f) (McKinney 1963).
e2 See note 45 supra.
1971] NOTES
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uninformed as to the institution of an action by his creditor until some
time after the property has been delivered to that creditor. The question
whether the serving of a summons and a complaint prior to or simultane-
ously with the repossession would be sufficient notice of the pendency of
the suit so as to justify a prehearing seizure remains unanswered.
An attempt was made by the defendants to establish the goods as either
secured or unsecured. As previously noted," UCC section 9-503 permits
nonjudicial repossession of a secured chattel in the event of a default. The
defendants apparently hoped to establish the goods as secured and pleaded
the UCC as a defense to their actions. The court rejected this contention,
reasoning that the plaintiff's allegations that there had been no default and
that in one instance no secured interest was held64 dissolved the argument of
defendants. Apparently then, any denial of default by a debtor would be
sufficient to obviate this section of the UCC. Thus, if the court's reasoning
were accepted by the United States Supreme Court or by other courts,
the potential devastation of the spirit and intent of section 9-503 is obvi-
ous. The court defends its position by noting that the New York statute
is not narrowly drawn to cover only secured transactions, but rather it
applies to any replevin situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that Laprease purports to meet the challenge of the
constitutionality of nonjudicial repossessions, regretfully many questions
remain. The failure of the court to limit the scope of "special" property
indicates the difficulty of making such a determination except on a case-
by-case basis-and then only at the whim of the judge involved. In the
final analysis a determination of whether the property is "special" seems
immaterial. Any deprivation of property without notice and the chance
to be heard is a denial of procedural due process. That the taking is tem-
porary or that the person so deprived is financially able to retrieve his prop-
erty pursuant to the statute does not obviate the objection to the denial of
due process. The court does not appear to make allowances for nonjudicial
repossession even under extraordinary circumstances. The Laprease court,
temporarily at least, has eradicated a centuries-old custom and right of
nonjudicial repossession. This appears to have been done without due re-
gard to the potential repercussions on the economic situation.
The Laprease court, in making the determination that the statute does
not cover merely special situations and circumstances, gives no indication
whether special circumstances might warrant the types of action con-
templated under the statute. The holding requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. However, certain extraordinary circumstances, such
as the situation where the defaulting vendee plans to remove himself and
the goods in question from the jurisdiction of the court, may justify extra-
e See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
o Plaintiff Messler alleged that the vendor held no secured interest in the property which he
threatened to seize. 315 F. Supp. at 723.
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ordinary action. Fahey recognized that public policy might be an over-
riding consideration permitting extraordinary remedies. The interest of
the creditor in being paid must be balanced against the right of the debtor
to due process. It would seem that in the interest of justice the scales would
tip more heavily, in extraordinary circumstances, in favor of the creditor's
being paid-or at least being able to regain lost goods. Laprease, however,
would not seem to permit even this type of prehearing seizure. Notice and
a chance to be heard, it appears, must be granted in every case prior to
seizure.'
The repossession statutes" now in force in Texas with regard to chattels
not covered by the UCC might be adversely affected if Laprease were up-
held by the United States Supreme Court. Although notice is usually given
in Texas prior to seizure, there is no statutory requirement to that effect.
This deficiency could be cleared up easily through minor legislation. The
Texas statute might be more palatable to the Court than its New York
counterpart because under the Texas statute the plaintiff may proceed only
if a court of competent jurisdiction issues a writ of attachment. On the
other hand this might be interpreted as a rubber stamp procedure involv-
ing little more than the securing of the signature of a judge who knows
nothing about the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the statutes do
not meet the most objectionable aspect of nonjudicial repossession-i.e.,
that the defendant is not allowed to be heard prior to seizure.
Laprease, like Sniadach and Goldberg, attempts to remove the objection-
able omission of procedural due process from the daily transactions of
American life. If the question in Laprease is faced by the United States
Supreme Court, the Court must balance the interest of the individual in
procedural due process against the potential disruption that could occur
in the aftermath of striking down this tradition-honored procedure. The
Court might find the holding in Laprease insufficiently narrow in scope;
for to uphold Laprease would be effectively to abrogate UCC section
9-503. Hopefully the Court would be hesitant to do this. Perhaps the
Court could distinguish between the repossession of secured and unsecured
property to avoid this result. Perhaps too, the Court could establish a
minimally acceptable standard of due process applicable to repossession
situations. Surely the Supreme Court would at least attempt to answer
these objections to Laprease."'
Ronald E. Grant
65 The court considered and rejected two further contentions by defendants. Defendants argued
that the New York statute was a descendant of the ancient Statute of Marlbridge of 1267, 52
Hen. 3, c. 21, and as such, should be sustained on the basis of its age. The court reasoned that age
alone is insufficient to sustain an otherwise unconstitutional statute. 315 F. Supp. at 723. The
court also dismissed the defendant's contention that the debtors had contractually consented to
nonjudicial repossession because the typical sales contract is filled with fine print relieving the
debtor of his constitutionally guaranteed rights. While debtors should be bound by their contracts,
the court doubted whether signing such a contract gave rise to a "competent waiver of a consti-
tutional right." Id. at 724.
" See notes 20-27 supra.
67Reecntly, in Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971), the Supreme Court refused to address
itself to some of the questions raised by Laprease because intervening changes in the status of the
NOTES1971)
